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The Mayers-Lo-Chau theorem establishes that no quantum bit commitment protocol is uncon-
ditionally secure. Nonetheless, there can be non-trivial upper bounds on both Bob’s probability of
correctly estimating Alice’s commitment and Alice’s probability of successfully unveiling whatever
bit she desires. In this paper, we seek to determine these bounds for generalizations of the BB84 bit
commitment protocol. In such protocols, an honest Alice commits to a bit by randomly choosing a
state from a specied set and submitting this to Bob, and later unveils the bit to Bob by announcing
the chosen state, at which point Bob measures the projector onto the state. Bob’s optimal cheating
strategy can be easily deduced from well-known results in the theory of quantum state estimation.
We show how to understand Alice’s most general cheating strategy, (which involves her submit-
ting to Bob one half of an entangled state) in terms of a well known theorem of Hughston, Josza
and Wootters. We also show how the problem of optimizing Alice’s cheating strategy for a xed
submitted state can be mapped onto a problem of state estimation. Finally, using the Bloch ball
representation of qubit states, we identify the optimal coherent attack for a class of protocols that
can be implemented with just a single qubit. These results provide a tight upper bound on Alice’s
probability of successfully unveiling whatever bit she desires in the protocol proposed by Aharonov
et al., and lead us to identify a qubit protocol with an even stronger bound.
I. INTRODUCTION
Suppose Alice and Bob wish to play a game wherein
Alice wins if she can correctly predict which of two mu-
tually exclusive events will occur and Bob wins if she
cannot. One way to play the game would be for Alice
to tell Bob her prediction before the events in question.
There are situations, however, where this is inappropri-
ate. For instance, Bob might be able to influence the rel-
ative probability of the events in question (indeed, which
of these events occurs might be entirely up to Bob). In
such cases, Alice wants Bob to know as little as possible
about her prediction until some time after the occurrence
of one of these events being predicted. Of course, Bob
will still want to receive some sort of ‘token’ of Alice’s
prediction prior to the events in question, since other-
wise Alice could always claim to have won the game.
Thus, Alice and Bob would like a cryptographic protocol
which forces Alice to ‘commit’ herself to a bit (which en-
codes her prediction), while ensuring that Bob can nd
out as little as possible about this bit until the time that
Alice reveals it to him. This is a bit commitment(BC)
protocol. In addition to the task of prediction described
above, BC appears as a primitive in many other crypto-
graphic tasks and is therefore of particular signicance
in cryptography.
A simple example of an implementation of BC pro-
ceeds as follows. Alice writes a ‘0’ or a ‘1’ on a piece of
paper, and locks this in a safe. She then sends the safe
to Bob, but keeps the key. When it comes time to reveal
her commitment, she sends the key to Bob, who opens
the safe and discovers the value of the bit. This protocol
binds Alice to the bit she chose at the outset since she
cannot change what is written on the piece of paper after
she submits the safe to Bob. However, it only conceals
the bit from Bob if he is unable to pick the lock, or force
the safe open, or image the contents of the safe.
This paper focuses on a particular class of quantum BC
protocols, specically, generalizations of the BC protocol
proposed by Bennett and Brassard in 1984 [1]. We shall
refer to these as generalized BB84 BC protocols. Within
such protocols, an honest Alice commits to a bit 0 by
choosing a state randomly from a specied set of states,
and by subsequently sending a system prepared in this
state to Bob. She commits to a bit 1 by choosing the
state from a dierent set. At the end of the protocol
she reveals to Bob which state she submitted and Bob
measures the projector onto this state to verify Alice’s
claim.
Bob can cheat in such a protocol by performing a mea-
surement on the systems submitted to him by Alice, prior
to Alice revealing her commitment. The measurement
that maximizes his probability of correctly estimating Al-
ice’s commitment can be determined from the well-known
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theory of state estimation [2] [3].
Alice can cheat by preparing the system she initially
submits to Bob in a state dierent from the ones spec-
ied by the protocol, in particular, by entangling this
system with an ancilla system that she keeps in her pos-
session, and by later performing a measurement on the
ancilla and choosing the state which she announces to
Bob based on the outcome of this measurement. This
has been called a coherent attack, since in general such
an attack requires Alice to maintain the coherence be-
tween the dierent possibilities in the random choice the
protocol asks her to make. It has also been called an
EPR-type attack, since in the original BB84 BC proto-
col, the optimal entangled state for Alice to prepare is
the EPR state. The problem of determining the coherent
attack that maximizes Alice’s probability of successfully
cheating has remained open to date. It is the goal of this
paper to begin to answer this question.
It has been shown by Mayers [4] and by Lo and Chau
[5] that an unconditionally secure BC protocol does not
exist [6]. In other words, it is not possible to devise a BC
protocol that is arbitrarily concealing, i.e. one for which
Bob’s probability of correctly estimating Alice’s commit-
ment is arbitrarily small, and arbitrarily binding, i.e. one
for which Alice’s probability of revealing whatever bit she
desires without being caught cheating is arbitrarily small.
Nonetheless, there remain interesting questions to be an-
swered about coherent attacks. For instance, it is possi-
ble to have a BC protocol that is partially binding and
partially concealing, wherein Alice and Bob’s probabili-
ties of successfully cheating are both bounded above [7].
Determining the optimal coherent attack is crucial to de-
termining the degree of bindingness that can be achieved
in such protocols.
Coherent attacks are also important in other quantum
cryptographic tasks between mistrustful parties - such
as coin tossing [8], cheat sensitive bit commitment [9],
bit escrow [10] and quantum gambling [11] - wherein a
type of bit commitment often appears as a subprotocol.
Understanding how to optimize coherent attacks is there-
fore important for settling questions about the degree of
security that can be achieved for such tasks.
We summarize here the main results of the paper. The
last four apply only to protocols that can be implemented
using a single qubit.
 We explain coherent attacks in terms of the well-
known theorem of Hughston, Josza and Wootters
[12].
 We demonstrate that the problem of nding the
optimal coherent attack for a fixed submitted state
can be mapped onto a problem of state estimation.
 We show that the optimal state for a cheating Alice
to submit has a support in the span of the supports
of the states which an honest Alice chooses from.
 We provide a simple geometrical picture on the
Bloch sphere of coherent attacks. In addition to
being useful for building one’s intuitions about
such attacks, this provides a convenient formalism
within which to solve the optimization problem, as
well as a geometrical criterion for whether or not
Alice can cheat with probability 1 in a given pro-
tocol.
 We nd analytic expressions for the optimal cheat-
ing strategy in the case where the sets of states that
an honest Alice chooses from each have no more
than two elements.
 Using these results, we determine Alice’s optimal
coherent attack in a BC protocol that was pro-
posed by Aharonov et al. [10]. Our result provides
a tight upper bound on Alice’s probability of un-
veiling whatever bit she desires, improving upon
the best previous known upper bound. This al-
lows us to determine, for this protocol, the trade-
o relation between the degree of concealment and
the degree of bindingness. We show that the same
trade-o relation can be achieved with several other
protocols.
 Finally, our results allow us to determine Alice’s
optimal coherent attack in a new type of general-
ized BB84 BC protocol wherein the trade-o rela-
tion between concealment and bindingness is better
than can be achieved with the protocol of Aharonov
et al.
The paper is organized as follows. In section II, we
provide an operational denition of bit commitment, de-
ne degrees of security, and describe the BB84 BC pro-
tocol and its generalization. In section III, we introduce
the notion of a convex decomposition of a density oper-
ator, review its properties, and demonstrate its signi-
cance for coherent attacks. In section IV, we formulate
the optimization problem to be solved. Results for pro-
tocols involving systems of arbitrary dimensionality and
for protocols involving qubits are presented in sections
V and VI respectively. Applications of these results are
presented in section VII, and section VIII contains our
concluding remarks.
II. BIT COMMITMENT
A. An operational definition of Bit Commitment
We begin by providing a denition of BC that is strictly
operational, that is, one which only makes reference to
the experimental operations carried out by the parties,
and not to any concepts that are particular to a phys-
ical theory. This seems to us to be the most sensible
way of proceeding for any information processing task,
since such tasks can be dened independently of their
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physical implementation and consequently of any physi-
cal theory describing this implementation. Among other
benets, this approach allows one to characterize a phys-
ical theory by the type of protocols which can be securely
implemented within a universe described by that theory.
A BC protocol is a cryptographic protocol between two
mistrustful parties. It can be dened in terms of the char-
acteristics of these parties’ honest (i.e., non-cheating)
strategies. We call the two parties Alice and Bob, and
assume that Alice is the one making the commitment.
The protocol is divided into three intervals, called the
commitment phase, the holding phase and the unveiling
phase. Each of these may involve many rounds of com-
munication between Alice and Bob. The result of the
protocol is one of three possibilities, denoted ‘0’, ‘1’ and
‘fail’. Which of these has occurred is determined from the
outcomes of all the measurements that an honest Bob has
made throughout the protocol. The protocol species the
strategy an honest Alice must adopt to commit to a bit
b: It is such that if both parties are honest and Alice fol-
lows the strategy for committing a bit 0(1); the result of
the protocol is necessarily ‘0’(‘1’). It follows that if the
outcome ‘fail’ occurs, an honest Bob can conclude that
Alice must have cheated. The protocol must also be such
that if both parties are honest, Alice does not, through
actions taken after the end of the commitment phase,
change the relative probability of the results ‘0’ and ‘1’
occurring, and Bob does not, prior to the beginning of
the unveiling phase, gain any information about Alice’s
commitment.
In the protocols we shall be considering, Alice will not
always be caught when she cheats. Thus, it can happen
that the result of the protocol is ‘b’ even though Alice
cheated and did not follow the honest strategy for com-
mitting a bit b: Indeed, Alice can, by cheating, change the
relative probability of the ‘0’ and ‘1’ results by actions
taken after the commitment phase. Since Alice can influ-
ence the result of the protocol by her choice of cheating
strategy, we shall say that ‘Alice unveils bit b’ whenever
the result ‘b’ occurs.1
B. Types of security
To dene the security of a BC protocol, one needs
to quantify the notions of concealment against Bob and
bindingness against Alice. In this paper, we focus upon
the probability that Bob can, prior to the beginning of
the unveiling phase, correctly estimate Alice’s commit-
ment (given that Alice is honest), and the probability
that Alice can, after the end of the commitment phase,
successfully unveil whatever bit she desires (given that
Bob is honest). We denote these by PE and PU respec-
tively. Note that these probabilities vary with the cheat-
ing strategy used. In this paper, we shall only consider
protocols wherein these are both equal to 1/2 for honest
strategies.2
A bit commitment protocol is said to be arbitrarily
binding if for all of Alice’s strategies, PU is bounded
above by 1=2 + "; where " can be made arbitrarily small
by increasing some security parameter in the protocol.
It is said to be arbitrarily concealing if for all of Bob’s
strategies, PE is bounded similarly. Although, as we
shall discuss shortly, no BC protocol can be arbitrar-
ily binding and arbitrarily concealing, both PE and PU
can have non-trivial upper bounds (that is, upper bounds
less than 1). We will refer to such protocols as partially
binding and partially concealing. The maxima of PE and
PU for a given protocol, which we denote by PmaxE and
PmaxU , quantify the degree of concealment and the degree
of bindingness that can be achieved in this protocol.
The implementation of BC using a safe, discussed in
the introduction, is binding against Alice, but is only
concealing against Bob if he has limited ‘safe-cracking’
resources. More useful implementations of bit commit-
ment instead rely for concealment on the assumption that
Bob has limited computational resources. Obviously, one
would prefer that the security of the protocol not depend
on the resources of either party, but rather only on the
laws of physics and the integrity of the party’s labora-
tories. A property of a protocol that has this feature is
said to hold unconditionally. All the properties of proto-
cols referred to in this paper, are properties which hold
unconditionally.
1It is important to remember that within our terminology ‘Alice unveiling bit b’ implies that she was not caught cheating.
Thus in a generalized BB84 BC protocol, when Alice announces b to Bob, we say that Alice is attempting to unveil a bit b, but
we only say that she has unveiled b if she passes Bob’s test.
2In most discussions of bit commitment, it is assumed that neither Alice nor Bob has any information at the commitment
phase about which bit will be more benecial for Alice to unveil. However, one must relax this assumption in order to consider
a game wherein Alice predicts which of two events will occur given some prior information on their relative probability. The
results of this paper can be generalized in a straightforward manner to apply to such a protocol. It suces to replace Eq. (5)
with PU = p0PU0 + p1PU1, where pb is the probability that Alice will wish to unveil bit b after the commitment phase, and to
generalize all subsequent expressions accordingly.
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C. The BB84 BC protocol
The rst proposal for a quantum mechanical imple-
mentation of a BC protocol was made by Bennett and
Brassard [1]. We refer to it as the BB84 BC protocol.
This was recognized by its authors to have no binding-
ness against Alice. Nonetheless, we begin by reviewing
this protocol, since it provides a simple example of the
type of cheating strategy with which this paper will be
concerned.
Imagine a protocol wherein Alice submits a qubit to
Bob during the commitment phase. To commit to a bit
0, she prepares the qubit in a state chosen uniformly from
the set fj0i ; j1ig, while to commit to a bit 1, she chooses
from the set fj+i ; j−ig ; where ji  (j0i  j1i) =p2:
No measurement Bob can do is able to distinguish these
two possibilities. At the unveiling phase, Alice can tell
Bob which state she submitted, and Bob can do a mea-
surement of the projector onto this state to verify her
honesty. If Alice tries to convince Bob that she submit-
ted a state drawn from the opposite set - for instance,
that she submitted j+i when in fact she submitted j0i -
then her probability of passing his test is only 1=2: The
BB84 BC protocol demands that Alice repeat her com-
mitment for N qubits, that is, that Alice either chooses
each qubit’s state uniformly from fj0i ; j1ig or uniformly
from fj+i ; j−ig. Clearly, in this case her probability of
passing Bob’s test when she lies about her commitment is
1=2N . So, with respect to strategies wherein Alice cheats
by lying about her commitment, such a protocol appears
to be arbitrarily binding.
However, Alice has another cheating strategy avail-
able to her. Prior to submitting a qubit to Bob, she
can entangle it with a qubit that she keeps in her pos-
session. Specically, she prepares the two in the EPR
state (j0i j1i − j1i j0i) =p2: Given that this state can also
be written as (j+i j−i − j−i j+i) =p2; it is clear that by
measuring the fj0i ; j1ig basis or fj+i ; j−ig basis on the
qubit in her possession, she projects the qubit in Bob’s
possession into the fj0i ; j1ig basis or fj+i ; j−ig basis
respectively. Moreover, the binary outcome of her mea-
surement will be perfectly anti-correlated with the state
of Bob’s qubit. So Alice knows precisely which state to
announce to Bob. Using this strategy, she can choose
which bit she wants to unveil just prior to the unveiling
phase, and always succeed at passing Bob’s test. This is
the so-called ‘coherent’ or ‘EPR’ attack.
The analysis thus far leaves open the possibility that
some other protocol using quantum primitives might suc-
ceed where the BB84 protocol failed. In fact, it has been
shown that for the most general nonrelativistic protocol,
unconditional security is not possible [4] [5] [8]. Nonethe-
less, there exist simple generalizations of the BB84 proto-
col that are both partially concealing and partially bind-
ing.
D. Generalizations of the BB84 BC protocol























values of n0 and n1 may not be the same). In order to
commit to bit b; an honest Alice chooses a state from





and sends a sys-
tem prepared in this state to Bob at the commitment
phase. An honest Bob simply stores the system during
the holding phase. At the unveiling phase, an honest
Alice announces b and k to Bob, and he measures the
projector onto
 bk : If Alice passes Bob’s test, she has
succeeded in unveiling the bit b; and the result of the
protocol is ‘b’: Otherwise, she is caught cheating, and
the result of the protocol is ‘fail’.3
To estimate Alice’s commitment, Bob must estimate






 0k 〈 0k ; or 1 = Pn1k=1 p1k  1k 〈 1k :
The problem of optimal state estimation has previously
been studied in great detail [2] [3], and in particular the
optimal measurement for discriminating two density op-
erators is well known. Using the optimal measurement,








Tr j0 − 1j ; (1)
where jAj =
p
AyA: It follows that as long as 0 and
1 do not have orthogonal supports, PmaxE is strictly less
than 1 and the protocol is partially concealing.
The complementary problem, of determining the max-
imum probability of Alice unveiling whatever bit she de-
sires and the strategy which achieves this maximum, has
remained open to date. Alice’s most general strategy
is of the following form. Prior to sending the system
to Bob, she entangles it with a system she keeps in her
possession. At the unveiling phase, she does one of two
measurements on the system in her possession, depend-
ing on whether she is attempting to unveil a 0 or a 1: She
chooses what integer k to announce to Bob based on the
3It should be noted that the honest strategy for Alice to commit b that we have described is equivalent with respect to
concealment to the following strategy: Alice couples the system she sends to Bob with a system she keeps in her possession (of





ψbk , where the jki form an orthonormal
basis. At the unveiling phase, she measures the basis jki in order to determine what integer to announce to Bob.
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outcome of this measurement. It follows that in order
to determine PmaxU , we must optimize over the entangled
state that Alice prepares, the two measurements she can
perform and the announcement she makes to Bob given
each possible outcome.
We shall see that there exist generalized BB84 BC pro-
tocols where PmaxU is strictly less than 1, so that these
protocols are partially binding.
It will be useful to introduce a few mathematical con-
cepts and results before turning to the optimization prob-
lem.
III. CONVEX DECOMPOSITIONS OF A
DENSITY OPERATOR
A. Definition and properties of convex
decompositions
We begin by introducing a mathematical concept that
will be critical for solving our problem. A convex decom-
position f(qk; k)gnk=1 of a density operator  is a set of






The k will be referred to as the elements of the convex
decomposition. We use the term ‘convex’ to distinguish
this from a decomposition of a pure state into a sum of
pure states, and from a decomposition of a density op-
erator into general sums of operators, that is, sums of
operators that are not necessarily positive. Nonetheless,
we will throughout this paper use the term decomposition
as a shorthand.4
Some terminology will be used in connection with con-
vex decompositions. The elements that receive non-
zero probability will be called the positively-weighted el-
ements. A decomposition will be called extremal if its
positively-weighted elements are all of rank 1 (i.e. if they
are all pure states). A set of density operators will be
called uncontractable if none of its members can be writ-
ten as a convex decomposition of the others. A convex de-
composition will be called uncontractable if its positively-
weighted elements are uncontractable. Clearly, all ex-
tremal decompositions are uncontractable. Finally, a de-
composition of  is trivial if its only positively-weighted
element is :
Another concept that will be useful in the present in-
vestigation is a relation that holds between sets of density
operators, and which we shall refer to as composable co-
incidence. Two sets of density operators f0kg and f1kg



















In other words, f0kg and f1kg are composably coinci-
dent if there exists a density operator which has a convex
decomposition in terms of the 0k’s and a convex decom-
position in terms of the 1k’s:
It will also be useful to set forth a few well-known facts
about convex decompositions [12]. A necessary and suf-
cient condition for a density operator  to appear in
some convex decomposition of  is for the eigenvectors
of  to be conned to the support of : The cardinal-
ity of an extremal decomposition of  must be greater
than or equal to the rank of . Finally, there sometimes
exists a prescription for obtaining the probability with
which a particular element appears in a convex decom-
position of a density operator. In convex decompositions
of  containing orthogonal elements, the probability as-





: However, for a general set of non-
orthogonal elements fkg that form a convex decomposi-
tion of ; the probabilities need not be unique; the same
set of density operators fkg may appear in dierent
convex decompositions of : For instance, the completely
mixed state in a 2d Hilbert space, I=2; has an indenumer-
ably innite number of convex decompositions with ele-
ments fj0i h0j ; j1i h1j ; j+i h+j ; j−i h−jg, since these yield








2 (1− ); 12 (1− )

where  is between 0
and 1: Nonetheless, a special case wherein the probabili-
ties are unique is if the convex decomposition is extremal
and of cardinality equal to the rank of . In this case,
a simple formula for the probability of a given element
can be given. If f(qk; jki hkj)g is such a decomposition,




hkj −1 jki ; (2)
where −1 is the inverse of the restriction of  to its sup-
port.
B. The connection between convex decompositions
and POVMs
The most general measurement on a system in quan-
tum mechanics is associated with a positive operator val-
ued measure(POVM). A POVM is a set of positive op-
erators that sum to the identity operator, that is, a
4Note that previous authors have used the term ρ-ensemble to refer to a convex decomposition of ρ.
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set fEkg such that for every k; hjEk ji  0 for all
ji 2 H; and Pk Ek = I: Neumark’s theorem [14] shows
that every POVM on a system can be implemented by
coupling to an ancilla system and performing projective
measurements on the ancilla. As it turns out, there is a
close mathematical connection between convex decompo-
sitions of  and POVMs, as was demonstrated by Hugh-
ston, Josza and Wootters [12].
Lemma There is a one-to-one map between the con-
vex decompositions of  and the POVMs over the
support of : Specically, the POVM fEkgnk=1 is as-







Proof. It is trivial to see that f(qk; k)gnk=1 is a de-
composition of  by summing the above equation over k
and using the fact that
P
k Ek = I: That any decompo-
sition of  is associated with some POVM follows from
the fact that
p
 is invertible on the support of : Specif-
ically, if this inverse is denoted by −1/2 then the resolu-
tion f(qk; k)gnk=1 is associated with the POVM fEkgnk=1
dened by Ek = qk−1/2k−1/2: 2.
We will also say that the POVM fEkgnk=1 generates the
convex decomposition f(qk; k)gnk=1. Note that we do not
treat the technicalities associated with decompositions of
innite cardinality in this paper, however a discussion of
these can be found in Cassinelli et al. [15].
C. The significance of convex decompositions to
coherent attacks
Suppose Alice and Bob share an entangled state for
which  is the reduced operator on Bob’s system. Prior
to any measurements, the best Alice can do in predicting
the outcomes of Bob’s measurements is to use the density
operator  in the Born rule. However, by virtue of the
correlations between her system and Bob’s, if she per-
forms a measurement and takes note of the outcome, her
ability to predict the outcomes of Bob’s measurements
will increase. Since all of the information that is relevant
to Alice predicting the outcomes of Bob’s measurements
is encoded in a density operator, it follows that when she
learns the outcome of her measurement, she should up-
date the density operator with which she describes Bob’s
system. Suppose that the kth outcome occurs with rela-
tive frequency qk, and leads Alice to update the density
operator with which she describes Bob’s system to k:
We say that the statistics of possible updates of Alice’s
description of Bob’s system are given by f(qk; k)g ; that
is, a set of probabilities and density operators:
As it turns out, the possibilities for these statistics are
given by the convex decompositions of : Specically, we
have:
HJW Theorem For every measurement Alice can
do, the statistics of possible updates of her descrip-
tion is given by some convex decomposition of ;
and for every convex decomposition of ; there ex-
ists some measurement for which the statistics of
possible updates is given by that decomposition.
This was rst demonstrated for extremal convex de-
compositions by Hughston, Josza and Wootters [12], and
it is straightforward to generalize the proof to arbitrary
convex decompositions. Since this theorem is the key to
coherent attacks, we present the proof here.
Proof. Suppose Alice and Bob share a state j i that
is any purication of  (a purication of  is any nor-
malized vector ji in HA ⊗HB with TrA (ji hj) = ).
If the non-zero eigenvalues of  are denoted by j ; and
fjejig is a set of normalized eigenvectors associated with





j jfji ⊗ jeji ;
where fjfjig is a set of orthonormal vectors for Alice’s
system. This way of writing j i is known as the bi-
orthogonal or Schmidt decomposition.
We begin by specifying the measurement that Alice
must do on her system in order to have her statistics
of possible updates given by the convex decomposition
f(qk; k)g of : If the POVM on Bob’s system that gen-






and U is the unitary map that satises
jfji = U jeji ;
then the required measurement on Alice’s system is the
one associated with the POVM fUEkU ygnk=1. The proof
is as follows.
The entangled state Alice and Bob share can be writ-





jU jeji ⊗ jeji :
Upon measuring the POVM fUEkU yg on her system
and obtaining outcome k; the projection postulate for
POVMs dictates that Alice should describe Bob’s sys-
tem by the unnormalized state
TrA
p























So after this measurement, with probability qk Alice
updates the density operator with which she describes
Bob’s system to k.
It is also easy to show that the statistics of possible
updates are given by some convex decomposition of  for
every measurement Alice can do. This follows from the
fact that every measurement on Alice’s system can be
described by a POVM of the form fUEkU yg for some
choice of fEkg given a particular U: 2
When Alice entangles the system she submits to Bob
with a system she keeps in her possession in such a way
that Bob’s reduced density operator is ; we shall say
that Alice submits  to Bob. When Alice performs a
measurement that leads to her statistics of possible up-
dates being given by the convex decomposition f(qk; k)g
of ; we shall say that Alice realizes this decomposition
on Bob’s system.
IV. THE NATURE OF THE OPTIMIZATION
PROBLEM
In section II.D, we formulated the problem of deter-
mining the optimal cheat strategy for Alice as a varia-
tional problem over the entangled state that she initially
prepares and the measurements she performs on her half
of the system. However, from the results of the section
III.C it is clear that in determining Alice’s probability of
unveiling the bit of her choosing, all that is important
about the entangled state she prepares is the reduced
density operator  she submits to Bob, and all that is
important about the measurement she performs is the
convex decomposition of  that she thereby realizes. It
suces therefore to vary over  and its convex decompo-
sitions.
We begin by showing that if Alice is attempting to un-
veil a bit b then it suces for her to realize a convex de-
composition with a number of elements less than or equal
to nb: The proof is as follows. Suppose Alice realizes a
convex decomposition f(~qj ; ~j)gn
′
j=1 with a number of ele-
ments n0 that is greater than nb. She still must announce
to Bob an index between 1 and nb; so that the elements of
this decomposition must be grouped into nb sets, where
elements in the kth set, Sk; correspond to announcing
the index k to Bob. When Alice announces index k, Bob
will measure the projector
 bk 〈 bk and obtain a posi-





 ~j  bk : How-
ever, there is always an nb-element convex decomposition
that yields the same probability of a positive result as
the one considered here; specically, the decomposition
f(qk; k)gnbk=1 with qkk =
P
j2Sk ~qj~j :
It follows that the probability of Alice succeeding at
unveiling the bit b given that she submits  and realizes







k  bk : (4)
















values of 0 and 1 respectively, then if she is equally likely
to wish to unveil 0 as 1 (as we are assuming in this pa-



















 bk  bk : (5)















subject to the con-













It is useful to divide this optimization problem into
two steps. In the rst step one determines, for an arbi-
trary but xed ; the nb-element convex decomposition
of  that maximizes the probability PUb of Alice unveil-
ing the bit b: Given this solution, the probability PU of
Alice unveiling the bit of her choosing can be expressed
entirely in terms of the submitted : In the second step
one determines the  that maximizes PU :
V. RESULTS FOR GENERAL PROTOCOLS
A. The connection to state estimation
We will show that the problem of optimizing the con-
vex decomposition for an arbitrary but xed density op-
erator has an intimate connection to the problem of op-
timal state estimation. As discussed in section III.B,
for every convex decomposition f(qk; k)gk there exists
a POVM fEkg ; dened over the support of ; that gen-







pEkp  bk :
A set of normalized states fbkg and probabilities fwbkg














   bk : (7)













   bk :
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We now recall [2] the problem of estimating the state
of a system that is known to have been prepared in one of
nb states fbkg with prior probabilities fwbkg. The most
general type of measurement is a POVM measurement,
and it suces to consider POVMs that have nb elements
(this is established by an argument exactly analogous to
the one provided above for the suciency of nb-element
decompositions in optmizing over coherent attacks). For









The connection between our problem and the state es-
timation problem is now clear. If fbkg and fwbkg are
dened by Eqs. (6) and (7), and fEkg is dened by (3),
then the following relation holds. The probability of un-





Bob’s reduced density operator is ; given that Alice’s
strategy consists of realizing an nb-element convex de-
composition f(qk; k)g of ; is a constant multiple of the
probability of correctly estimating the state of a system,
known to be prepared in one of nb states fbkg with prior
probabilities fwbkg; given a measurement of the POVMfEkg:
So, if one has the solution to the problem of nding the
POVM that maximizes the probability of correctly esti-
mating the state of a system from among a set of pure
states, then one also has the solution to the problem of
nding the convex decomposition of  that Alice should
realize to maximize her probability of passing Bob’s test.
There is a duality between these two information theo-
retic tasks.
This result is very useful since it connects a task about
which very little is known to one about which a great deal
is known. In particular, one is able to infer some general
features of the optimal cheat strategy by appealing to
some well-known theorems on state estimation.










then the optimal convex decomposition of  is extremal.










linearly independent. It is well known that in estimating
a state drawn from a set of linearly independent states,
the optimal POVM has elements of rank 1 [2]. The con-
vex decomposition that is associated with such a POVM
has elements that are pure states, i.e., it is extremal.
B. The support of the optimal density operator
We now turn to the problem of determining the op-
timal density operator for Alice to submit to Bob. We
begin by showing that although Alice could cheat by sub-
mitting a system with more degrees of freedom than the
honest protocol species, she gains no advantage by do-
ing so. In other words, the optimal  has a support that is






We establish this by showing that for any  that has sup-
port strictly greater than this span, there is a  that has
support that is equal to or a subspace of this span and
that yields a greater value of PU : Suppose the optimal






: The maximum probability of Alice un-











 qbk bk  bk :
However, if Alice submits the density operator
 = GG=Tr (G) ;























then her probability of unveiling whatever bit she desires
is
PU () = PmaxU (
) =Tr (G) :
Since Tr (G) < 1, it follows that PU () > PmaxU (
) :
C. Conditions for unveiling with certainty
Finally, we consider the question of whether, for a par-
ticular protocol, Alice can unveil the bit of her choos-
ing with certainty. The necessary and sucient condi-
tion for there to be a strategy that makes PUb = 1 for













 bk 〈 bk}nbk=1 forms a con-
vex decomposition of : The necessary and sucient con-
dition for there to be a strategy that makes PU = 1 is that



















must be composably coincident.
The results described in this section constitute all that
we shall say about the optimal cheat strategy for an ar-
bitrary protocol. For the rest of this paper, we shall









whose union span at most a two dimensional
Hilbert space, that is, protocols that can be implemented
using a single qubit.
VI. RESULTS FOR QUBIT PROTOCOLS
A. The Bloch ball representation
Our optimization problem is greatly simplied in the
case of a 2D Hilbert space since there is a one-to-one
mapping between the set of all density operators in such
a space and the set of all points within the unit ball of
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R3. For clarity, we begin by reminding the reader about
the details of this mapping.
If one denes an inner product between operators




; the set of operators over a
Hilbert space forms an inner product space. In a 2d
Hilbert space, a particularly convenient orthogonal ba-
sis for the set of operators is the set of Pauli opera-
tors fx; y; z ; Ig, with matrix representations in the























Any operator A can therefore be written as A =
1
2 (a0I + ~a  ~) where ~= (x; y; z) and ~a = (ax; ay; az) ;
with a0; ax; ay; az 2 C1: In particular, for a density op-
erator ; the constraints of unit trace (Tr() = 1) and




(I + ~r  ~) ;
where ~r 2 R3 and j~rj  1:
Thus we see that every density operator is represented
by a vector ~r within the unit ball of R3, which we shall
refer to as the Bloch ball.5
Density operators describing pure states are charac-
terized by a vanishing determinant, det () = 0; which
corresponds to a vector of unit length, j~rj = 1 that we
shall sometimes denote by r^. Thus, pure states are rep-
resented by the points on the surface of the ball. The
completely mixed state,  = 12I; is represented by ~r = ~0;
which is the point at the centre of the ball. If two den-
sity operators 1 and 2 are represented by vectors ~r1
and ~r2; the inner product between 1 and 2 is given
by Tr (12) = 12 (1 + ~r1  ~r2) : It follows that orthog-
onal states are represented by antipodal points, since
Tr(12) = 0 implies ~r1  ~r2 = −1:
We are now in a position to obtain a representation
on the Bloch ball of all the density operators that can
be formed by convex combination of a particular set of





for some probability distribution fqkgnk=1: Since the set
of density operators that can be formed by an arbitrary
set of elements fkgnk=1 is the same as the set that can be
formed by an uncontractable set of elements from which
all the states in fkgnk=1 can be built up by convex com-
bination, it suces to consider only uncontractable sets
of elements.
Denoting the Bloch vectors associated with  and k









To understand what this manifold of points looks like,
consider the simplest case of n = 2. The above equation
can then be written as
~r = ~s1 +  (~s2 − ~s1) ; where 0    1:
This is simply the parametric equation for a segment of
a straight line extending between ~s1 and ~s2: Similarly, in
the case of n = 3; we have
~r = ~s1 +  (~s2 − ~s1) +  (~s3 − ~s2) ;
where 0    1 and 0    :
Since 1; 2 and 3 were assumed to form an uncon-
tractable set of elements, ~s1, ~s2 and ~s3 cannot lie on a
line, and therefore dene the vertices of a triangle. The
above equation is the parametric equation for the surface
of points inside this triangle: For n = 4; we have
~r = ~s1 +  (~s2 − ~s1) +  (~s3 − ~s2) +  (~s4 − ~s3) ;
where 0    1, 0     and 0    .
Again, since 1; 2, 3 and 4 were assumed to form
an uncontractable set of elements, none of ~s1, ~s2, ~s3 or ~s4
can lie along the line segment dened by any other two,
nor inside the surface of the triangle dened by any other
three, and thus these vectors dene the vertices of either
a convex quadrilateral or a tetrahedron. The above equa-
tion is the parametric equation for the surface of points
inside this quadrilateral, or the volume of points inside
this tetrahedron. Similarly, for greater than 4 uncon-
tractable elements, we obtain the parametric equation for
the points inside an n-vertex convex polygon or convex
polyhedron. All told, in the case of a set of n uncon-
tractable elements, the set of density operators that can
be composed from these will be represented by the region
inside an n-vertex convex polytope. A few dierent sets
of states and the density operators that can be composed
from them are depicted in Fig.1.
5The surface of the ball is usually referred to as the Bloch sphere or the Riemann sphere in the context of spins, and the
Poincare sphere in the context of photon polarization.
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Fig.1 A depiction of three sets of states containing 2,
3 and 4 elements respectively. The points in the Bloch
ball representing these states are indicated by small black
spheres. The manifolds inside the line segment, triangle
and tetrahedron that are defined by each set of points rep-
resent all the density operators that can be composed with
each set of states.
Fig.2 An illustration of three convex decompositions
of a fixed density operator, two of which are 2-element
decompositions, and one of which is a 3-element decom-
position. The point in the Bloch ball representing the den-
sity operator is indicated with a large black sphere. Each
convex decomposition is represented by a polytope con-
taining the point representing the density operator, the
vertices of which represent the elements of the decompo-
sition. These are indicated in grey. The longer of the
two line segments, which has its vertices on the surface
of the Bloch ball, is an example of an extremal convex
decomposition.
It is now easy to see the solution to a complemen-
tary problem, namely, how to obtain a representation
on the Bloch ball of all the uncontractable convex de-
compositions of a particular density operator . If  is
represented by the point ~r; then every n-element uncon-
tractable convex decomposition of  is represented by an
n-vertex convex polytope which contains ~r. For instance,
every 2-element uncontractable convex decomposition of
 is represented by a line segment that contains ~r; every
3-element uncontractable convex decomposition of  is
represented by a triangle that contains ~r; and so forth.
In Fig.2, we illustrate a few of the convex decompositions
of a xed density operator.
Of particular interest to us in the present context are
extremal convex decompositions of a density operator 
(which are always uncontractable). Since pure states are
associated with unit Bloch vectors, the convex polytopes
associated with such decompositions have their vertices
on the surface of the Bloch ball. Fig.2 provides an exam-
ple of this distinction.
Fig.3 A depiction of a fixed density operator and two
sets of states, the lower of which decomposes the density
operator and the uppermost of which does not.
B. The conditions under which Alice can unveil the
bit of her choosing with certainty
In section V.C it was pointed out that a strategy with






: The Bloch ball representation gives a
simple way of testing whether this condition is satised
for protocols restricted to a 2D Hilbert space. It suces






and to determine whether the
point representing  is contained in this polytope or not.
If it is, then Alice can unveil bit b with certainty. If it is
not, then she cannot. An example of the two possibilities
is provided in Fig.3.
More importantly, we can now answer the question of
whether there exists a strategy for Alice with PU = 1 for
protocols restricted to a 2D Hilbert space. As pointed
out in section V.C this only occurs if the two sets of
states are composably coincident. It is clear now how to
verify whether this is the case or not. Simply plot the
convex polytopes associated with both sets of states, and
determine whether they intersect one another or not. If
they do, then any point inside the region of intersection
corresponds to a density operator that is decomposed by
both sets and consequently lets Alice unveil the bit of
her choosing with probability 1. If they do not, then this
probability is strictly less than 1:
The convex polytopes associated with the sets of states
used in the BB84 BC protocol are depicted in Fig.4.
Since these cross at the origin, it follows that if Alice sub-
mits to Bob the completely mixed state, she can achieve
PU = 1: So we simply have a restatement of the fact that
if Alice initially prepares a maximally entangled state,
such as the EPR state, and submits half to Bob, then she
can achieve PU = 1: The protocols we shall consider in
10
the rest of this paper are associated with non-intersecting
convex polytopes. See Figs. 6-10 for examples.
Fig.4. The Bloch ball representation of the BB84 BC
protocol. Since the polytopes representing the sets of
states defined by the protocol intersect, Alice can submit
the density operator associated with their intersection to
make her probability of unveiling whatever bit she desires
equal to unity.
C. Optimizing over the convex decompositions of an
arbitrary but fixed density operator
We now turn to the problem of determining the op-
timal EPR cheating strategy for a qubit protocol. We
do not solve this problem completely; rather, we solve it
under the further restriction that each set contains only
linearly independent states. In the present 2D context,
linear independence implies that each set can have no
more than two elements.
As discussed in section IV, it is useful to split the prob-
lem into two parts involving optimization over convex de-
compositions of an arbitrary but xed density operator,
followed by optimization over density operators. We ad-
dress these two parts of the problem in this section and
the next section respectively.
We begin with the problem of maximizing the proba-
bility, PUb; that Alice can unveil the bit b given that she
submitted a density operator : This maximum must be
found with respect to variations in the convex decompo-
sition of  that she realizes. The optimal decomposition






order to simplify the notation in this section, we drop
the index b from
 bk and nb. We also assume that  is
impure, since otherwise there is no optimization problem
to be solved.
1. A set containing one element (n = 1)
In this case, Bob’s test is xed (he always measures
the projector onto j 1i), so the probability of passing
this test depends only on  and not on the convex de-
composition of  that Alice realizes. Thus, there is no
optimization over decompositions to be performed in this
case.
2. A set containing two elements (n = 2)
Let the Bloch vectors associated with j ki and  be de-
noted by a^k and ~r respectively, and let those associated
with the elements, k; of the two-element convex decom-
position f(qk; k)g2k=1 that Alice realizes be denoted by
~sk: In terms of these, Alice’s probability of passing Bob’s








qk (a^k  ~sk)
!
: (8)




We nd that the optimal convex decomposition of ~r is
given by
~sopt1 = ~r + L+ (~r) d^;






1− ~r  ~soptk
(10)
where










ja^1 − a^2j : (12)
Note that
~sopt1  = ~sopt2  = 1, which means that this is an
extremal convex decomposition. The proof of optimality
is presented in Appendix A.
This solution has a very simple geometrical descrip-
tion. It is the convex decomposition that is represented
by the chord (i.e. line segment whose endpoints lie on
the surface of the ball) that contains ~r and that is parallel
to the chord dened by a^1,a^2: An example is presented
in Fig.5.
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Fig.5. An illustration of the optimal convex decom-
position for Alice to realize when she has submitted to
Bob a fixed density operator(indicated by the large black
sphere) and is attempting to convince him that he has
one of two states (indicated by the small black spheres).
This is represented by the chord(indicated in grey) that
is parallel to the chord defined by the two states. After
Alice realizes this decomposition (by making a measure-
ment on the system that is entangled with Bob’s), she
updates her description of Bob’s system to whichever of
the elements it happened to be collapsed to(indicated by
the grey spheres). When it comes time for Alice to an-
nounce to Bob which of the two states he should test for
to verify her honesty, she announces the state which has
the smallest angular separation from the element of the
decomposition onto which she has collapsed his system.

















(h 1jj 1i+ h 2jj 2i)
+
q
2 (1− Tr(2)) jh 1j 2ij2 + (h 1jj 1i − h 2jj 2i)2:
D. Optimizing over density operators
We now consider the problem of determining the op-
timal density operator  for Alice to submit to Bob in
order to maximize her probability of unveiling the bit of
her choosing. The solution will depend on the values of












dent, there are only three possibilities to address: both
sets contain two elements; one set contains two elements
and the other contains one element; both sets contain
one element. We shall consider each of these in turn.
1. Both sets contain two elements (n0 = n1 = 2)
Denote the Bloch vector associated with the state
 bk
by a^bk: The result of the previous section indicates that
whatever the optimal ~r is, the optimal convex decom-
position for unveiling bit b is represented by the chord
passing through ~r parallel to the chord dened by a^b1; a^b2:
We therefore have that Alice’s probability of unveiling
the bit of her choosing given an arbitrary ~r and given
that when she attempts to unveil the bit b she realizes
























It will be convenient to adopt the convention that the
states in the protocol are indexed in such a way that〈






: In terms of the Bloch ball,
the convention states that if one draws the chords de-












We consider two cases.
Case 1: The chords dened by a^01; a^02 and a^11; a^12 are
parallel.
In this case d^0 = d^1 and there are a family of optimal














This family corresponds to the points on the chord of the





2) and that passes through the point on the sur-
face of the ball that is equidistant between a^01 and a^
1
1.
This is illustrated in Fig.7.








In this case, the optimal ~r is unique and is given by
~ropt =
(








































1− (a^b1  n^2 and where
n^ = d^0  d^1;
d^?b = d^b  n^;
d^b =
a^b1 − a^b2a^b1 − a^b2 : (18)
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Thus, the solution has one of two forms depending on
whether the condition j~rmaxj  1 holds or not. If it does







a^01 + a^11 ; which is sim-
ply the point on the surface of the Bloch ball that is
equidistant between a^01 and a^11 along the geodesic which
connects them (recall that in our labelling convention a^01







2). Fig.6 provides an example of a BC pro-
tocol where this is the case. If the condition j~rmaxj  1
does hold, then ~ropt = ~rmax. We will not attempt to pro-
vide a geometrical description of this point in the general
case, however Figs. 4 and 9 provide simple examples of
BC protocols where j~rmaxj  1.
Fig.6. A BC protocol where the two sets of states are
represented by chords that lie in a plane, but which do
not intersect inside the Bloch ball. The optimal density
operator is represented by the point that lies equidistant
between the two closest chord endpoints on the geodesic
which connects them.
In situations having a high degree of symmetry, one can
easily deduce some of the features of ~ropt: We present a
few such cases.
Case 2.1: If the chord dened by a^01 and a^
0
2 and the
chord dened by a^11 and a^12 lie in a plane, then ~rmax is the
point of intersection of the lines containing these chords.
If this point falls inside the Bloch ball (j~rmaxj  1), then
it represents the optimal density operator. This conrms
the results of section V.C. The BB84 BC protocol, illus-
trated in Fig.4, is an instance of such a case. If the point
of intersection falls outside the Bloch ball (j~rmaxj > 1),
then the optimal density operator is as described above.
The BC protocol that is illustrated in Fig.6 is an instance
of such a case.
Case 2.2: If the chord dened by a^01 and a^
0
2 and the
chord dened by a^11 and a^12 both pass through the n^ axis,
then ~ropt lies along this axis:
Case 2.3: If the chord dened by a^01 and a^
0
2 and the
chord dened by a^11 and a^
1
2 are parallel to, equidistant
from, and on either side of the equatorial plane perpen-
dicular to n^; then ~ropt lies in that plane.
If the conditions of cases 2.2 and 2.3 both hold, then
~ropt lies at the centre of the Bloch ball. This corresponds
to Alice submitting the completely mixed state. An ex-
ample of such a protocol is provided in Fig.9. Although in
the example of this gure the two chords point in orthog-
onal directions, this is not necessary, it is only necessary
that they not be parallel.
The proofs of the results of this section are presented
in Appendix B.
2. One set contains one element and one set contains two
elements (n0 = 1, n1 = 2)









has only a single element while the other has
two. Without loss of generality we may assume that the
single element set is the b = 0 set, and we denote its
unique element by
 0 : So in order to unveil a bit value
of 1 Alice can announce either k = 1 or k = 2 and must
then pass Bob’s test for
 1k ; while to unveil a bit value
of 0 Alice has no choice but to pass a test for the state 0 :









This corresponds to case 1 of section VI.D.1 in the limit
that a^01 and a^
0
2 converge to a single point a^




+ d^1; for 0    2:
This family corresponds to the points on the chord of the
Bloch ball that is parallel to the chord dened by a^11; a^
1
2
and that passes through the point on the surface of the
ball that is equidistant between a^0 and a^11. The BC pro-




 6= 〈 0j 12 corresponds to case 2 of section
VI.D.1 in the limit that a^01 and a^
0
2 converge to the point





3. Both sets contain one element (n0 = 1, n1 = 1)
We now assume there is only a single element in both
of the sets, and denote each of these states by
 b : Thus
to unveil a bit value of b Alice must pass Bob’s test for b : Consider rst the possibility that  0 and  1 are
orthogonal. In this case, no matter what  Alice submits,
her probability of unveiling either bit is strictly 1/2.
When
 0 and  1 are not orthogonal, the situation
corresponds to case 2 of section VI.D.1, in the limit that
a^b1 and a^
b
2 converge to a single point a^
b. In this limit we
again nd j~rmaxj > 1: Consequently,
~ropt =
a^0 + a^1
ja^0 + a^1j :
An example is presented in Fig.8.
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Fig.7. An illustration of a BC protocol of the form
proposed by Aharonov et al. [10]. The two sets of states
are given by Eq. (19) with  = =8: There is a family of
optimal density operators lying along the chord indicated
in grey.
VII. APPLICATIONS OF THE RESULTS
These results can be applied to the generalized BB84
BC protocol proposed by Aharonov et al. [10]. The pro-
tocol is dened by the following states, from which an
honest Alice chooses uniformly 01 = ji ;  02 = j−i ; 11 = j=2− i ;  12 = j=2 + i ; (19)
where ji = cos  j0i + sin  j1i and  is some xed an-
gle satisfying 0 <   pi4 : The sets of states associ-
ated with bits 0 and 1 describe parallel chords on the
Bloch ball, as depicted in Fig.7. We therefore have
an instance of case 1 of section VI.D.1. It follows
that an optimal strategy for Alice is to simply submit
j+i = 1p
2
(j0i+ j1i) and tell Bob to test for  b1, where
b is the bit she wishes to unveil. Another is to submit
j−i = 1p
2
(j0i − j1i) and to tell Bob to test for  b2 :
So Alice does not need to make use of entanglement in
this case. The most general optimal strategy is for Alice
to submit  = w j+i h+j + (1 − w) j−i h−j ; realize the
convex decomposition f(w; j+i h+j) ; ((1− w); j−i h−j)g ;
and tell Bob to test for
 b1 ( b2 upon obtaining the
outcome j+i (j−i) : Alice’s maximum probability of un-




(1 + sin 2) :
Previously, the best known upper bound on this
probability was PU  12
(
1 + 1cos2 2θ
(p
1 + 2 cos2 2 − 1 ;
as can be inferred from the results in section 5 of Ref. [10].












We can now compare this with Bob’s maximal prob-
ability of estimating Alice’s commitment correctly. If
Alice follows the honest protocol for committing a bit b;
she chooses uniformly between
 b1 and  b2 and sub-
mits a system in this state. Bob must therefore dis-
criminate between density operators 0 and 1 dened
by b = 12
P2
k=1
 bk 〈 bk : His maximum probability of




(1 + cos 2) :
It is worth noting that the quantity 12Trj0 − 1j appear-
ing in Eq.(1) is simply half the Euclidean distance be-
tween the points in the Bloch ball representing 0 and
1:
Fig.8. An illustration of a BC protocol of the form
specified in Eq. (21), with γ = =4: The optimal den-
sity operator is indicated by the large black sphere. BC
protocols of this form achieve the same trade-off between
concealment and bindingness as those of the form pro-
posed by Aharonov et al.
From the above expression for PmaxU and P
max
E ; we can
conclude that there is a trade-o between these quantities
of the form
(PmaxU − 1=2)2 + (PmaxE − 1=2)2 = 1=4: (20)
At  = 0; PmaxE = 1 and P
max
U = 1=2; so that there
is no concealment against Bob, but perfect bindingness
against Alice (since PmaxU = 1=2 for an honest Alice).
At  = =4; PmaxE = 1=2 and P
max
U = 1; so that the
roles of Alice and Bob are reversed. The only choice of











Our results also imply that the same trade-o between
PmaxU and P
max
E can be achieved with the most simple
imaginable BC protocol, namely one wherein Alice sub-
mits to Bob one of two non-orthogonal states. Specif-
ically, to commit a bit b; an honest Alice sends Bob a
qubit in the state
 b ; where 0 = j0i ; 1 = jγi ; (21)
where γ is some xed angle satisfying 0 < γ  =2: An
example of this protocol is illustrated in Fig.8. This is
an instance where n0 = 1 and n1 = 1, which was consid-
ered in section VI.D.3. One can infer from the results of
that section that Alice’s optimal strategy is to submit the
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state jγ=2i and to announce whatever bit she wishes to
unveil. It is straightforward to verify that this protocol
has the same properties as the one described above.
It is easy to understand the equivalence of these proto-
cols geometrically. PmaxU is proportional to the cosine of
the angular separation of the endpoints of the polytopes
(chords or points) representing the sets of states an hon-
est Alice chooses from. Meanwhile, PmaxE is proportional
to the Euclidean distance between the midpoints of these
polytopes. It is easy to see from Figs. 7 and 8 that if
the endpoints have the same angular separation, then the
midpoints have the same Euclidean separation.
Interestingly, it turns out that any protocol satisfy-
ing the conditions of cases 2.2 and 2.3 of section VI.D.1
also yields exactly the same trade-o between PmaxU and
PmaxE . Specically, one can use any protocol of the form 01 = j; 0i ;  02 = j−; 0i ; 11 = j=2− ; i ;  12 = j=2 + ;−i ; (22)
where j; i = cos  j0i+eiφ sin  j1i and  and  are xed
angles satisfying 0 <   pi4 ; 0 <   =2: Fig.9 depicts
an example of such a protocol. Geometrically, PmaxU is
no longer given by the angle between the endpoints of
the two polytopes representing the states an honest Al-
ice chooses from but rather the angle between the end-
points of these polytopes and the closest endpoints of
the polytopes representing the elements of the convex
decomposition that Alice realizes. Nonetheless, the fact
that the latter angle is simply half of the former angle
ensures that PmaxU is the same. The only dierence is
that Alice’s optimal strategy in this case requires the use
of entanglement.
Finally, we consider a protocol wherein there is a single
state associated with committing a bit 0 but two states
associated with committing bit 1; specically, 0 = j0i ; 11 = ji ;  12 = j−i ; (23)
where  is some xed angle satisfying 0 <   pi2 : An
example of this protocol is provided in Fig.10. It is of







: From the results of that section, we can in-
fer that there are a family of optimal coherent at-
tacks of the following form. Alice submits a den-
sity operator of the form  = w j=2i h=2j + (1 −
w) j−=2i h−=2j : If she decides to try to unveil bit 0;
she simply announces this to Bob. If she decides to
try to unveil bit 1; she realizes the convex decompo-
sition f(w; j=2i h=2j) ; ((1− w); j−=2i h−=2j)g ; and
upon obtaining the outcome j=2i (j−=2i) tells Bob to
test for ji (j−i) : Alice’s maximum probability of un-








Meanwhile, from Eq.(1), we can infer that Bob’s maxi-



































4 ’ : 80902:
From a comparison of the trade-os (19) and (24), it is
easy to verify that a protocol which uses the states (23)
achieves, for a given bindingness (a given PmaxU ), a con-
cealment that is greater (and thus a PmaxE that is smaller)
than the concealment that can be achieved in a protocol
using the states (19), (21) or (22).
This point is easy to see geometrically. We compare
the states (21) with the states (23) for simplicity. From
an inspection of Figs. 8 and 10 it is easy to see that if the
endpoints of the polytopes dened by the two protocols
have the same angular separation, the midpoints do not
have the same Euclidean separation - the separation is
smaller for a BC protocol dened by the states (23):
An obvious question to ask at this point is whether the
trade-o relation of Eq.(24) is optimal, in the sense that
the concealment against Bob is maximized for a given
bindingness against Alice. Elsewhere [7] we show that
it is optimal among a certain class of protocols (which
includes the generalized BB84 protocols) that can be im-
plemented using a single qubit. It is also shown that a
better trade-o can be achieved with a BC protocol that
can be implemented using a single qutrit, that is, a three-
level system. The protocol we suggest in Ref. [7] is not
a generalized BB84 BC protocol, however, an equivalent
protocol that is of the generalized BB84 form has been
proposed by Ambainis [16].
Fig.9. An illustration of a BC protocol of the form
specified in Eq. (22), with  = =8 and  = : The
optimal density operator in this case lies at the origin.
Depending on which bit Alice desires to unveil, she real-
izes the convex decomposition parallel to one or the other
of the two chords.
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Fig.10. An illustration of a BC protocol of the form





There is a family of optimal density operators lying along
the chord indicated in grey. BC protocols of this form
achieve a better trade-off between concealment and bind-
ingness than those of the form proposed by Aharonov et
al.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
We have formulated the problem of optimizing coher-
ent attacks on Generalized BB84 BC protocols in terms
of a well known theorem of Hughston, Josza and Woot-
ters. We have found that there is a mapping between
this problem and one of state estimation. Specically,
we have shown that the convex decomposition of a xed
density operator that is optimal for successfully prepar-
ing one of a set of states is related in a simple way to the
POVM measurement that is optimal for discriminating
among certain transformations of these states.
We have identied Alice’s optimal coherent attack for
a class of generalized BB84 BC protocols that can be
implemented using a single qubit. From these results
we have determined the degree of bindingness that can
be achieved in the BC protocol proposed by Aharonov
et al., improving upon the best previous upper bound.
This enables us to identify the trade-o between the de-
gree of concealment and the degree of bindingness for this
protocol. It has also led us to identify several qubit pro-
tocols that achieve the same trade-o as the proposal of
Aharonov et al. , as well as a qubit protocol that achieves
a better trade-o.
In optimizing over Alice’s strategies, we have relied on
the Bloch ball representation of quantum states. This
provides a convenient geometrical picture of a coherent
attack. Although this representation can be generalized
to higher dimensions [17], it is unlikely that such simple
geometric pictures can be provided in the general case. In
any event, there remain many questions to be answered
even for qubit protocols, for which this approach is likely
to provide some insight. For instance, one can use it to
consider qubit BC protocols that are not generalizations
of the BB84 BC protocol.
In another paper [7], we determine the optimal co-
herent attack in a class of BC protocols that is larger
than the set of generalized BB84 protocols. However,
the problem of determining the optimal trade-o between
concealment and bindingness from among all BC proto-
cols remains open.
Beyond their relevance to bit commitment, coherent
attacks are interesting as an example of what might be
considered a fundamental task in quantum information
processing, namely, the preparation of quantum states at
a remote location. One can dene many variants of this
task, depending on whether the parties at the two loca-
tions are cooperative or adversarial, and depending on
the available resources, such as the number of classical
or quantum bits that can be exchanged, and the amount
of prior entanglement the parties share. Bennett et al.
[18] have recently considered remote state preparation in
the case of cooperative parties who share prior entan-
glement and a classical channel. In the type of remote
state preparation we have considered in this paper, the
parties are adversarial and although Alice makes use of a
quantum channel, she does so at a time prior to knowing
which state she is supposed to prepare.
It seems to us that the primitive of remote state prepa-
ration, construed in its most general sense, may be as
fundamental as the primitive of state estimation and just
as signicant for the purposes of determining what sorts
of information processing tasks can be successfully im-
plemented using quantum primitives. The mapping dis-
cussed above between state estimation and the particular
type of remote state preparation considered in this pa-
per suggests that there may be other connections between
these two problems. In future work, we hope to explore
this analogy in more detail.
IX. ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
We gratefully acknowledge J. E. Sipe for useful dis-
cussions. This work was supported by the National Sci-
ence and Engineering Research Council of Canada, the
Austrian Science Foundation FWF, and the TMR pro-
grams of the European Union Project No. ERBFM-
RXCT960087.
[1] C. H. Bennett and G. Brassard, in Proceedings of IEEE
International Conference on Computers, Systems, and
Signal Processing (IEEE, New York, 1984), p. 175.
[2] C. W. Helstrom, Quantum Detection and Estimation
Theory (Academic Press, New York, 1976).
[3] C. A. Fuchs, Distinguishability and Accessible Informa-
tion in Quantum Theory, Ph.D. thesis, University of New
Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, 1996.
[4] D. Mayers, Phys. Rev. Lett. 78, 3414 (1997).
16
[5] H.-K. Lo and H. F. Chau, Phys. Rev. Lett. 78, 3410
(1997).
[6] This assumes that the two parties occupy laboratories
whose spatial dimensions are small compared to the sep-
aration between Alice and Bob. If this assumption does
not hold, then relativistic constraints allow one to achieve
a form of bit commitment, as demonstrated by A. Kent,
Phys. Rev. Lett. 83, 1447 (1999).
[7] R. W. Spekkens and T. Rudolph, quant-ph/0106019.
[8] H.-K. Lo and H. F. Chau, Physica D, 120, 177 (1998).
[9] L. Hardy and A. Kent, quant-ph/9911043.
[10] D. Aharonov et al., quant-ph/0004017.
[11] L. Goldenberg, L. Vaidman and S. Wiesner, Phys. Rev.
Lett. 82, 3356 (1999).
[12] L. P. Hughston, R. Josza and W. Wootters, Phys. Lett.
A 183, 14 (1993).
[13] E. T. Jaynes, Phys. Rev. 108, 171 (1957).
[14] A. Peres, Found. Phys. 20, 1441 (1990).
[15] G. Cassinelli, E. De Vito and A. Levrero, J. Math. Anal-
ysis and Appl. 210, 475 (1997).
[16] A. Ambainis, ‘A new protocol and lower bounds for quan-
tum coin flipping’, preprint (2000).
[17] F. T. Hioe and J. H. Eberly, Phys. Rev. Lett. 47, 838
(1981); J. Schlienz and G. Mahler, Phys. Rev. A. 52,
4396 (1995).
[18] C. H. Bennett et al., quant-ph/0006044 (2000).
X. APPENDIX A
We here provide the proof of optimality of the convex
decomposition specied by Eq.(9). First, we establish
the applicability of Jaynes’ rule, dened in Eq.(2), to the
probabilities in the optimal convex decomposition. This
requires showing that the optimal decomposition is an
extremal decomposition with the number of positively-
weighted elements equal to the rank of :
This is trivial to see for a pure : We now demonstrate
it for an impure : Because we have assumed that the
f kgnk=1 are linearly independent, they span the whole
2D Hilbert space, and because  has rank 2, its support
is the 2D Hilbert space. Thus, the f kgnk=1 are linearly
independent and have a span that is equal to the sup-
port of ; which, as shown in section V.A by the mapping
to the state estimation problem, is sucient to establish
that the optimal convex decomposition is an extremal de-
composition. It was shown in section IV that the number
of positively-weighted elements in the optimal convex de-
composition is less than or equal to n: In the present case,
n = 2; so this number must be less than or equal to 2.
However, since  is impure, every convex decompositions
of  has at least 2 elements receiving non-zero probabil-
ity. Thus, the number must be precisely 2, which is the
rank of :
Jaynes’ rule provides a formula for the probabilities in
a convex decomposition of  in terms of  and the ele-
ments in the decomposition. In terms of Bloch vectors,





1− ~r  s^k ;
where we have written s^k rather than ~sk since the ele-
ments of the optimal decomposition, being pure, can be
represented by unit Bloch vectors. Substituting this ex-
pression, together with the constraint that ~r = q1s^1+q2s^2








(1 + a^2  ~r) + 14

1− j~rj2
 ((a^1 − a^2)  s^1)
(1− ~r  s^1) :
Rather than varying this quantity with respect to s^1; we
vary with respect to an unnormalized vector ~s1; taking
s^1 = ~s1= j~s1j ; where j~s1j =
p
~s1  ~s1: Setting PE(s^1) = 0
and making use of the fact that  j~s1j = 
p
~s1  ~s1 =
~s1  s^1; we nd that the optimal s^1 satises
(1− s^1  ~r) (a^1 − a^2) + (s^1  (a^1 − a^2)) (~r − s^1) = 0:
By assumption, j~rj 6= 1 (since  is impure). It follows
that (1− s^1  ~r) 6= 0; and (~r − s^1) 6= ~0: Since it is also the
case that (a^1 − a^2) 6= ~0; we infer that s^1  (a^1 − a^2) 6= 0.
Taking the dot product of this equation with a^1 + a^2; we
nd
(~r − s^1)  (a^1 + a^2) = 0:
Consequently, the solutions that extremize PUb are of the
form
s^ext1 = ~r + L (~r) d^;
where d^ is given in Eq.(3). The constraint
s^ext1  = 1
implies that L (~r) have the form specied in Eq.(11).










Since the coecient of L (~r) is positive, and L+ (~r) 
L− (~r) ; the maximum PUb occurs for s^ext1+ ; while the min-
imum occurs for s^ext1− . Thus, the optimal s^1 given ~r is
s^opt1 = ~r + L+ (~r) d^:
The constraint ~r =
P
k qk~sk then implies that
s^opt2 = ~r + L− (~r) d^:
This establishes what we set out to prove.
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XI. APPENDIX B
We here present the proofs of the results of section
VI.D.1.
Proof for case 1. The parallel condition is equiva-









~r + L0+ (~r) d^0

 (a^01 + a^11 :




implies that ~ropt can be any vector of the form specied
in Eq.(14).2
Proof for case 2. Starting from Eq.(13) , we ex-
tremize PU with respect to variations in ~r by setting
PU (~r) = 0: Using the fact that r = 
p
~r  ~r = ~r  ~r=r;
and
Lb+ (~r) = −
 
~r + Lb+ (~r) d^b
~r  d^b + Lb+ (~r)
!
 ~r;







 ~r + Lb+ (~r) d^b
~r  d^b + Lb+ (~r)
!!
= 0: (25)
We now introduce the notation
x0 = ~r  d^?1
x1 = ~r  d^?0
x2 = ~r  n^;
where d^?1 ; d^
?
0 and n^ are dened in Eq. (18). Making use




































 ~r + L0+ (~r) d^0






















An analogous result holds for b = 1: Plugging these ex-
pressions into Eq.(25) and taking the dot product with

































1− x21 − x22x2:
The values of x0; x1 and x2 that maximize PU ; denoted




2 ; are easily seen to be those given
by Eq.(17). These dene ~rmax through Eq.(16).
If j~rmaxj  1, then it corresponds to the optimal den-
sity operator. If j~rmaxj > 1; then there is no extremum
of PU inside the Bloch ball and the optimal density op-
erator must be represented by a point on the boundary
of the ball. Such a point corresponds to a pure state.
Consequently there is no freedom in the convex decom-
position Alice realizes, and all that she must decide is
what state to tell Bob to test for. If she tells him
 0k
when she wishes to unveil a bit value of 0 and
 1k′ when
she wishes to unveil a bit value of 1; then in terms of




















r^  (a^0k + a^1k′ ;
where we write r^ to emphasize that we are varying over





maximizes PU : In our notational convention, a^01 and a^
1
1
are the closest pair of Bloch vectors from the two sets, so
Alice should choose k = k0 = 1: It follows that the opti-
mal density operator is represented by the Bloch vector
dened in Eq.(15).
Note that it may occur that a^02 and a^
1
2 are as close
to one another as a^01 and a^
1
1; that is, it may occur that
there is no unique ‘closest’ pair of Bloch vectors. How-
ever, in this case one will not nd j~rmaxj > 1: The reason
is as follows. If one did nd j~rmaxj > 1; then the opti-
mal ~r would have to be a pure state. However, since the







2jaˆ02+aˆ12j would yield the same PU ; any mixture of these
would also yield this PU : This in turn would imply that
there existed a solution with j~rmaxj < 1:2
Proof for case 2.1. Since a^01,a^02; a^11 and a^12 all lie in
a plane, a^bk  n^ is independent of b and k: In this case, we
nd xmax0 = a^11  d^?1 ; xmax1 = a^01  d^?0 and xmax2 = a^01  n^:
That this corresponds to the point of intersection can
be veried from the parametric equations for the lines
containing the two chords.2
Proof for case 2.2. If the chord dened by a^b1
and a^b2 passes through the n^ axis, then it must lie in
the plane of d^b and n^; so that a^bk  d^?b = 0: It fol-
lows that xmax0 = x
max
1 = 0; and thus ~r
max = xmax2 n^:
Since jxmax2 j  1; we know that j~rmaxj  1; so that
~ropt = ~rmax = xmax2 n^:2
Proof for case 2.3. The case being considered cor-
responds to n^  (a^0k + a^1k = 0: We must consider the two
possibilities j~rmaxj  1 and j~rmaxj > 1: In the former,





ther way, the condition n^  (a^0k + a^1k = 0 implies that
~ropt  n^ = 0:2
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